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THE WORST SURPRISE OF ALL: NO RIGHT TO
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF THE
PROSECUTION'S UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
ED WARD J. IMWINKELRIED *
INTRODUCTION**
rTTW of the most celebrated criminal trials of this decade have been
X the prosecution of Wayne Williams in Atlanta, Georgia' and the
case of Claus von Bulow in Newport, Rhode Island.2 Williams was
charged with the murders of Nathaniel Carter and Jimmy Ray Payne,
and the prosecution in the latter case alleged that von Bulow attempted
to kill his millionaire wife, Martha. Though the trials were held miles
apart and involved defendants with radically different backgrounds, the
trials shared a common denominator: in both trials, the key prosecution
evidence was uncharged misconduct-evidence of misdeeds by the de-
fendant other than the crime for which the defendant was being tried.3
One of the turning points in the Williams case occurred when the trial
judge decided to admit prosecution evidence of ten other homicides sup-
posedly linked to Williams.4 Williams never was formally charged with
any of those killings.5 Similarly, in the von Bulow case, the most dramatic
prosecution evidence was the testimony of Mrs. Isles, the alleged lover of
von Bulow. On the witness stand, she described her romantic involve-
ment with the defendant-the romance that the prosecution contended
supplied the motive for murder.6 Adultery was not included in the indict-
* Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis; B.A. 1967, University of San
Francisco; J.D. 1969, University of San Francisco. The author would like to thank his
colleague Professor Floyd Feeney for his perceptive suggestions for improving this manu-
script. The author would also like to thank Messrs. Lorenzo Formoso and Ronald Rich-
ards, who served as the author's research assistants on this Article.
** The general subject of uncharged misconduct evidence is examined extensively in,
E. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence (1984), published by CaUaghan &
Co., 155 Phingsten Road, Deerfield, IL 60015. The following Introduction summarizes
relevant portions of that treatise.
1. See Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983).
2. See State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
3. "Uncharged" denotes only that the misdeed is not the crime specified in the cur-
rent indictment or information against the defendant. E. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Mis-
conduct Evidence § 2:10, at 28 (1984) [hereinafter Imwinkelried 1]. The defendant may
have been convicted of that crime in an earlier proceeding. In the instant trial, the prose-
cutor may use the earlier conviction as evidence of the defendant's commission of the
earlier act. Id. at § 2:09, at 26.
4. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 783-85, 312 S.E.2d 40, 70-71 (1984).
5. Id. at 755, 312 S.E.2d at 51.
6. See State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1021 (RI.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 875
(1984).
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ment of Claus von Bulow. 7
It is not unusual that the judges in Williams and von Bulow admitted
evidence of the defendants' other alleged misdeeds, despite the fact that
the accusatory pleadings filed against Williams and von Bulow made no
mention of those misdeeds. The evidence law in every American juris-
diction authorizes the receipt into evidence of a party's uncharged mis-
conduct.8 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which represents the
governing doctrine, states that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 9
On the one hand, this doctrine forbids the prosecution from using a
defendant's other crimes as evidence of bad character. The prosecution
may not imply immoral, law-breaking character from the defendant's
other crimes and then simplistically argue that the defendant's bad char-
acter increases the probability that the defendant committed the act al-
leged in the indictment or information.' 0 On the other hand, the
prosecution may offer evidence of the defendant's uncharged crimes if
the crimes logically are relevant to the case on a noncharacter theory."
In Williams, the prosecution contended that all twelve killings evidenced
a plan showing Williams' identity as the perpetrator of the two charged
murders.' 2 In von Bulow, the prosecution relied on a motive theory of
relevance. 13
The conviction in the Williams case and the guilty verdict in the first
von Bulow trial 4 illustrate the impact that uncharged misconduct evi-
dence can have on a jury. Experienced trial attorneys know that the
judge's decision on the admission of uncharged misconduct can be the
pivotal ruling in a prosecution. 5 Veteran defense attorneys often plan
7. See id. at 999.
8. See generally Imwinkelried I, supra note 3, § 1:01, at 2; C. McCormick, McCor-
mick on Evidence § 190 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
9. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
10. See Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 59, 68-69 (1984) ("[E]vidence that the defendant in a criminal prosecution
has a prior conviction may induce the jury to use the commonly held bias that a person
previously convicted of a crime is dispositionally inclined toward repeated criminal
behavior.").
11. See United States v. Forgoine, 487 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 976 (1974); Vowell v. State, 4 Ark. App. 175, 181, 628 S.W.2d 599, 603, rev'd on
other grounds, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118 (1982); State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667, 671-
72 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
12. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 749, 312 S.E.2d 40, 48 (1984).
13. State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1021 (R.I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
14. von Bulow's conviction was vacated due to violations of the fourth amendment
and the Rhode Island Constitution. See State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1018-21
(R.I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
15. See Carter, The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts II, 70 L.Q. Rev. 214,
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their trial strategy to avoid the admission of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence.16 One commentator has dubbed this species of evidence the "Pros-
ecutor's Delight."17
It is understandable that prosecutors delight in offering uncharged
misconduct against a defendant; both the empirical studies and the cases
show that the admission of uncharged misconduct can have a devastating
effect on the defense. The available research data indicate that un-
charged misconduct evidence can sway the juror. A study at the London
School of Economics demonstrated that the admission of a defendant's
uncharged crimes significantly increases the likelihood of a finding of
guilt." The Chicago Jury Project reached the same conclusion. 9 The
Chicago researchers concluded that, as a practical matter, the presump-
tion of innocence operates only for defendants without prior criminal
records.2" Uncharged misconduct evidence effectively strips the defend-
ant of the presumption of innocence.2' If the judge admits a defendant's
other crimes and the jury thereby learns of the defendant's prior record,
the jury probably will adopt a "different... calculus of probabilities" in
deciding whether to convict.22 The most recent study, conducted under
the auspices of the National Science Foundation Law and Social Science
Program,23 found that, although persons frequently disagree in their esti-
mation of the prejudical effect of evidence, "the greatest agreement... is
found in connection with evidence suggesting [other] immoral conduct
215 (1954) (admission of uncharged misconduct evidence "often virtually decisive of the
whole case").
16. See Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in Prose-
cutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 Ariz. L. Rev. 212, 218 (1965) ("[TIhe fact that lawyers
often shape their entire trial strategy to avoid admission of these other offenses is indica-
five that experience has shown the grave danger to the defendant of such evidence.").
17. See Comment, Exclusion of Prior Acquittax" An Attack on the "Prosecutor's De-
light" 21 UCLA L. Rev. 892, 895-96 (1974) (characterized as "Prosecutor's Delight"
because evidence of prior acts almost always will be admissible through one of the numer-
ous exceptions to exclusionary rule).
18. See Note, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. Mich. J.L Reform 535,
544-45 (1974) ("juries do take evidence of other offenses into account in some circum-
stances and... such cognizance increases convictions").
19. See H. Kalven, Jr. & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 161 (1966) ("[I]f we take the
average of the cases where the defendant has no record as against the cases where he has
a record, the acquittal record declines from 42 to 25 percent.") [hereinafter Kalven &
Zeisel]; Note, Other Crimes at Tria" Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 Yale LJ. 763,
777 (1961) (" 'j]urors almost universally used defendant's record to conclude that he was
a bad man and hence was more likely than not guilty of the crime for which he was then
standing trial.'" (quoting letter from Dale W. Broeder, Associate Professor, University of
Nebraska College of Law, on file in Yale Law Library)).
20. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 19, at 179.
21. See Reiser, Evidence of Other Criminal Acts in South Carolina, 28 S.C.L Rev.
125, 126 (1976).
22. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 19, at 179.
23. See Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of
Evidence. Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L
Rev. 1147.
1987]
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by the defendant." 24 The subjects in the study consistently rated un-
charged misconduct evidence as highly prejudicial.25
The judiciary also appreciates the importance of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence. The California Supreme Court has asserted that un-
charged misconduct is "the most prejudicial evidence imaginable against
an accused." 26 Some appellate courts believe that this type of evidence is
so virulent that a finding of erroneous admission at trial constitutes pre-
sumptive harmful error.27 In a 1986 decision, a panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that if the trial judge errs in admitting
uncharged misconduct evidence, the burden rests on the prosecution to
show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.28 There
can be little question that uncharged misconduct is extraordinarily po-
tent prosecution evidence.
One of the essential functions of the criminal discovery system is to
give the defense a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the prosecution's
evidence.29 Although the scope of criminal discovery in America still
seems narrower than the scope of discovery in other countries,30 our
criminal discovery system has made great forward strides in recent
years.31
The early English common law granted defendants virtually no discov-
ery rights,32 and the American courts followed that view well into the
24. See id. at 1162.
25. See id.
26. People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 429, 722 P.2d 197, 205, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913,
922 (1986).
27. See United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1984); State v.
Brooks, 675 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Brown, 670 S.W.2d 140, 141
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
28. See United States v. Huddleston, 802 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 811
F.2d 974 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd 56 U.S.L.W. 4363 (U.S. May 3, 1988). The major-
ity so held over a vigorous dissent that the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard
should be reserved for constitutional errors. See id. at 881.
29. See Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases - In Search of a Standard, 1964 Duke
L.J. 477, 478.
30. The generalization often is made that the scope of criminal discovery is broader in
countries such as Scotland, Canada and England. See id. at 493-94; Brennan, The Crimi-
nal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 279, 293. Nu-
merous articles contain statements that the scope of criminal discovery in England is
particularly broad. See id. at 293; Everett, supra note 29, at 493; Krantz, Pretrial Discov-
ery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 Neb. L. Rev. 127,
139 (1963); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif. L. Rev.
56, 64-65 (1961) [hereinafter Louisell I]. These latter statements, however, are mislead-
ing. The Crown Court permits broad discovery, but discovery in the magistrates' courts
is far more limited. Feeney, Advance Disclosure of the Prosecution Case, in Managing
Criminal Justice: A Collection of Papers 94, 95-96 (D. Moxon ed. 1985); Baldwin &
Feeney, Defence Disclosure in the Magistrates' Courts, 1986 Mod. L. Rev. 593, 599.
31. See Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law,
14 Vand. L. Rev. 921, 929 (1961) [hereinafter Louisell II]; Louisell I, supra note 30, at 59.
32. See Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 293,
294-95 (1960); Krantz, supra note 30, at 128 (discussing Rex v. Holland, 4 Dum. & E.
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
twentieth century.3 3 Since World War II, however, the proponents of
expanded discovery have made remarkable progress,' and the undenia-
ble trend has been toward more liberal discovery.35 For example, in
modem federal criminal practice, the defendant has a right to pretrial
discovery of his or her confessions36 and convictions, 37 as well as reports
of scientific analyses of physical evidence in the case.38
Ironically, despite the great progress in expanding criminal discov-
ery,39 in most jurisdictions the defendant has no right to discover the
prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence.' The defendant's inabil-
ity to force pretrial revelation of that evidence represents a major gap in
the criminal discovery system. As discussed above, testimony about a
defendant's other crimes is one of the most damaging types of evidence
available to the prosecution. Further, since by definition the uncharged
crime is not mentioned in the indictment or information, a grave danger
exists that the defense attorney will be surprised when the prosecution
offers the evidence at trial. Thus, the defense counsel may be completely
unprepared to meet the prosecution's most damning evidence.
It is clear that the defendant has no common law right to pretrial dis-
covery of uncharged misconduct evidence.4" Similarly, the courts have
691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792)); Norton, Discovery in the Criminal Process, 61 J.
Crim. L, Criminology & Pol. Sci. 11, 11-12 (1970).
33. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 282 (citing Justice Cardozo's opinion in People ex
rel Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 32, 156 N.E. 84, 86 (1927)); Fletcher, supra
note 32, at 298-99 (citing Chief Justice Vanderbilt's opinion in State v. Tune, 13 NJ. 203,
98 A.2d 881 (1953)); Krantz, supra note 30, at 129 (citing Justice Cardozo's opinion in
People ex reL Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 33, 156 N.E. 84, 87 (1927)).
34. See Shatz, California Criminal Discovery: Eliminating Anachronistic Limitations
Imposed on the Defendant, 9 U.S.F. L. Rev. 259, 262 (1974); see also United States v.
American Oil Co., 286 F. Supp. 742, 752 (D.N.J. 1968) ("a marked increase ... in the
scope of discovery allowed"); United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 470 (N.D. IM.
1967) ("The recent trends in the area of criminal discovery suggest that under the present
rules, the courts indeed would be justified, as to many matters at least, in allowing discov-
ery as far reaching as is presently permissible under the civil rules .... ").
35. See United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 470 (N.D. Il. 1967); 2 C. Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure § 252, at 43
(1982) ("it is unmistakably clear that the trend is toward freer disclosure"); Note, Disco,-
ery of Witness Identity Under Preliminary Proposed Federal Criminal Rule 16, 12 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 603, 626 (1971) ("[t]he trend ... appears clear").
36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
37. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B) ("prior criminal record").
38. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
39. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 283.
40. See Imwinkelried I, supra note 3, § 9:06; see also infra note 122 (jurisdictions
permitting discovery).
41. The prosecutor voluntarily could disclose the evidence to the defense. Prosecu-
tors sometimes open their files, containing uncharged misconduct evidence, to the de-
fense. See United States v. McDaniel, 428 F. Supp. 1226, 1228-29 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
(government agreed to permit discovery pursuant to defense motions). Prosecutors tend
to do so only when they regard defense counsel as trustworthy. See Louisell I, supra note
31, at 934. Many factors influence the prosecutor's decision whether to make voluntary
disclosure to the defense. See Note, The Conundrum of Criminal Discovery: Constitu-
tional Arguments, ABA Standards, Federal Rules, and Kentucky Law, 64 Ky. L.J. 800,
1987]
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been unwilling to construe any of the discovery provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rules 7,42 12, 16(a)(1)(B), 44
845-46 (1976) (after reviewing a survey of United States Attorneys' voluntary decisions,
commentator concluded "[s]uch a system of informal pretrial discovery appears arbitrary
and capricious"). Further, many prosecutors reveal the evidence only when it is so
strong that it is likely to induce a guilty plea. See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in
Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 228, 237 (1964); Note, supra, at 845.46. The
defense, however, needs discovery precisely when the evidence is weak or debatable. Dis-
closure under these circumstances will enable the defense to conduct a pretrial investiga-
tion to generate testimony to rebut the prosecution evidence at trial.
The judge, in his or her discretion, might order pretrial disclosure. Judges possess
inherent power to order discovery that is not expressly authorized by statute or court
rule. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 293 n.45; Hewitt & Bell, Beyond Rule 16: The
Inherent Power of the Federal Court to Order Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 7
U.S.F. L. Rev. 233, 240-43 (1973); Traynor, supra, at 231, 240, 242. Nearly all jurisdic-
tions recognize this power, see United States v. Gallo, 654 F. Supp. 463, 471 (E.D.N.Y.
1987); Krantz, supra note 30, at 147, and the Advisory Committee Note to the 1974
amendments of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 acknowledges it as well. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16 advisory committee note. As Judge Kaufman has noted, judges must exer-
cise their power when the discovery authorized by statute and court rule falls below the
constitutional minimum. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 322 n.105. The courts, however,
have recognized an extensive power to authorize discovery in the interests of justice, even
when discovery is not constitutionally mandated. See United States v. Campagnuolo, 592
F.2d 852, 857 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Germain, 411 F. Supp. 719, 725 (S.D.
Ohio 1975).
Although the consensus is that the inherent power exists, the power does not guarantee
defendants pretrial discovery of uncharged misconduct evidence. The judge's discretion
allows him or her to exercise the power or to decline to do so. See United States v.
Germain, 411 F. Supp. 719, 725 (S.D. Ohio 1975). Moreover, judges are reluctant to
exercise the power to grant discovery. The reluctance stems from Congress' response to
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See Traynor, supra, at 240. In that deci-
sion, rendered June 3, 1957, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent power to permit
discovery not explicitly authorized by the federal rules. See Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957). Congress reacted swiftly and decisively. The Jencks decision so
upset Congress that by September 2 of the same year, it passed legislation that effectively
overruled the decision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982); Louisell I, supra note 30, at 73;
Krantz, supra note 30, at 142-43. In the wake of the congressional reaction to Jencks, the
lower courts understandably have been reluctant to exercise their inherent power to com-
pel discovery. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance ofAdvantage in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1182 (1960); Traynor, supra, at 240-41 (citing
illustrative cases).
42. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) sanctions bills of particulars. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 7(f). Bills suffer from several limitations. One limitation is that the grant of a
bill is highly discretionary. See United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 778
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Goldstein, supra note 41, at 1176. In addition, the courts have devel-
oped the rule that a defendant may not employ a bill to obtain "evidentiary" matter. See
United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 2 W. LaFave & J.
Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.2, at 460 (1984); Goldstein, supra note 41, at 1176; Nor-
ton, supra note 32, at 27; Traynor, supra note 41, at 233. As a result, bills seldom are
granted. See Goldstein, supra note 41, at 1176; Louisell I, supra note 30, at 68. A bill of
particulars thus offers little assistance to a defendant attempting to discover prosecution
evidence such as testimony about uncharged misconduct. See Louisell I, supra note 30,
at 68.
43. Rule 12 governs the procedures for pretrial hearings and motions. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 12. The judge can dispose of pretrial discovery motions at the pretrial hearing. Con-
ceivably, the judge could exercise the inherent power discussed supra note 41 to order the
revelation of the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence at the hearing. See
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16(a)(1)(C),45 and 17 -- as creating the right. It is true that the courts'
United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1440 (11th Cir. 1986) (trial judge not pre-
vented from ordering disclosure of similar acts evidence), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1567
(1987). Rule 12, however, cannot be interpreted as according the defendant a right to the
discovery of such evidence. As this Article establishes later, the courts have refused to
construe Rule 16 as creating that right. See infra text accompanying notes 41-50. Rule
12's discovery provisions incorporate Rule 16's limitations by reference. Rule 12(b)(4)
refers to "[r]equests for discovery under Rule 16," Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(4), and Rule
12(d)(2) alludes to "evidence which the defendant may be entitled to discover under Rule
16 subject to any relevant limitations prescribed in Rule 16." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d)(2).
The courts reason that if no right to discovery exists under Rule 16, a fortiori, no right
exists under Rule 12. See United States v. Payden, 613 F. Supp. 800, 820 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (Rule 12(d)(2) intended to enable defendant to file motion to supress, not to pro-
vide him with information undiscoverable under Rule 16); United States v. Climatemp,
482 F. Supp. 376, 391 (N.D. IM. 1979) (motion to discover Rule 16 information pursuant
to Rule 12(d)(2) denied), aff'd mem., 705 F.2d 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134
(1983).
44. Rule 16(a)(1)(B) provides that "[u]pon request of the defendant, the government
shall furnish to the defendant such copy of his prior criminal record, if any, as is within
the possession, custody, or control of the government .... ." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. The
courts have construed this provision "very strictly." 8 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Prac-
tice 16.04[2], at 16-72 (1987) [hereinafter Moore]. The courts have held that the ex-
pression "criminal records" includes only the defendant's prior convictions or, at most,
misdeeds listed on the defendant's official F.B.I. rap sheet. See, eg., Trujillo v. Sullivan,
815 F.2d 597, 611 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1440 n.2
(11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1567 (1987); United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d
1426, 1441 (10th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 848 (1986); United States v. Reed,
724 F.2d 677, 680-81 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Savides, 661 F. Supp. 1024, 1026
(N.D. III. 1987); United States v. Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United
States v. Nakashian, 635 F. Supp. 761, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
820 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 576 F. Supp.
1384, 1396-98 (W.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Deardorff, 343 F. Supp. 1033, 1044 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also infra note 48 (discussing F.B.I. rap sheet).
45. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) reads:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangi-
ble objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within
the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to
the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the govern-
ment as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the
defendant.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
By its terms, this rule applies only to documentary and physical evidence. If a witness
comes forward and gives the prosecution an oral report about the defendant's uncharged
misconduct, the Rule would not compel the prosecution to disclose the oral report. Fur-
thermore, even assuming that the witness gives the prosecution a written statement, the
defense is not necessarily guaranteed pretrial discovery of the report. One prerequisite to
the prosecution's duty to disclose is its intent to use a report "as evidence in chief at the
trial." Id. If the prosecution opts to present the witness' oral testimony without attempt-
ing to introduce the statement as corroboration, Rule 16(a)(1)(C) appears inapplicable.
For that matter, it is doubtful that the prosecution could offier the statement as evidence.
When the witness is a private citizen, the witness' statement would not qualify under
either the business entry or official record hearsay exceptions contained in Fed. R. Evid.
803(6)-(8). The landmark case of Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930),
holds that a private citizen's report to the police does not constitute a business entry since
the citizen has no business duty to furnish the information. The Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 803(6) approvingly cites Johnson. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee
19871
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narrow interpretation of Rule 16(a)(1)(B), which guarantees the defend-
ant pretrial discovery of his "criminal record,"'47 is debatable.4" The nar-
note. Because the statement could not be used as evidence in the prosecutor's case-in-
chief, the defense would not be entitled to pretrial discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C).
46. Rule 17 permits a defendant to request subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses
and the production of documentary and physical evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17. Rule 17,
on its face, does not include the restrictions set out in Rule 16 governing the source or
manner of obtaining evidentiary documents. See Everett, supra note 29, at 483. In Bow-
man Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951), however, the Supreme Court made
it clear that Rule 17 may not be used generally as a discovery tool. See id. at 220; accord
United States v. Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22, 26 (N.D. Ohio 1957); United States v. Schneider-
man, 104 F. Supp. 405, 408 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Norton, supra note 32, at 27-28. A Rule 17
subpoena must contain a very detailed description of any requested evidence, see In re
Rabbinical Seminary Netzach Israel Ramailis, 450 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
("must identify the demanded documents sufficiently clearly to permit compliance, and
the request may not be so broad as to be oppressive"), and it is difficult for a defense
attorney to draft a sufficiently detailed description unless the attorney has advance knowl-
edge of the evidence. See Everett, supra note 29, at 483. Absent a device to learn whether
the prosecution possesses any evidence of uncharged misconduct, the defense attorney
cannot satisfy the specificity requirements of Rule 17.
47. See supra note 44.
48. The legislative history of Rule 16 supports the argument that, at least sometimes,
Rule 16(a)(1)(B) entitles the defense to discover the prosecution's uncharged misconduct
evidence.
At one time, Congress considered amending Rule 16 to give the defense the right to
learn the identity of the prosecution's prospective witnesses and certain information
about the witnesses' background. See H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, re-
printed in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 674, 684. The House Judiciary Com-
mittee report on the proposed amendment indicates that Congress did not intend to limit
the expression, "criminal record," to prior convictions. See id. In pertinent part, the
report states that "[t]he proposed rule enlarges the scope of the defendant's discovery to
include a copy of his prior criminal record and a list of the names and addresses, plus
record of prior felony convictions, of all witnesses the prosecution intends to call during
its case-in-chief." Id. This statement suggests that Congress intended the term "criminal
record" to mean something broader than the defendant's criminal convictions.
During consideration of the amendment that added the "criminal record" language to
Rule 16(a)(1)(B), both the House Judiciary Committee's report and Senator McClellan's
remarks on the Senate floor indicate that Congress intended this language to extend to
the contents of the defendant's F.B.I. rap sheet. See United States v. Trejo-Zambrano,
582 F.2d 460, 465 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 247,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 674, 687;
121 Cong. Rec. 23323 (1975); 8 Moore, supra note 44, 1 16.04[2] at 16-71 n.61 (1987).
F.B.I. rap sheets contain not only convictions but also arrests and indictments that have
not resulted in a conviction. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 732 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Everett, supra note 29, at
508-09.
Once it is conceded that "criminal record" includes FBI rap sheet entries for acts that
have not resulted in a conviction, it becomes difficult to deny the defendant access to
other written reports of uncharged misconduct in the prosecution's possession. Senator
McClellan, however, asserted in debate that "the Government's obligation under this
Rule should be deemed met by obtaining a copy of the F.B.I. 'rap' sheet." 121 Cong.
Rec. 23323 (1975). The full committee report, however, would seem entitled to more
weight in interpreting the rule. The text of the rule does not limit the scope of "criminal
record" to acts listed on the F.B.I. sheet, and the House report states only that "[t]he
prosecutor can ordinarily discharge his obligation.., by obtaining a copy of the F.B.I.
'rap sheet.'" H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 674, 687 (emphasis added). If the prosector already possesses a
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row construction of the rule, however, is so well-settled that it would be
difficult to overturn this interpretation.4 9 Furthermore, reversing the
narrow interpretation of the federal rule would not guarantee the defend-
ant a right to discover uncharged misconduct evidence in all jurisdic-
tions, because many states either have no statute on point or a statute
worded differently than Rule 16(a)(1)(B). ° Consequently, it seems pref-
erable to analyze the merits of the question of the discoverability of Rule
404(b) evidence, and, if the analysis demonstrates that the evidence
should be discoverable as a matter of policy, to enact statutes or court
rules that expressly mandate discoverability.
The next two sections of this Article undertake that analysis. Part I
evaluates the case for pretrial discovery of the prosecution's uncharged
misconduct evidence. Part II addresses the principal objections to com-
pulsory pretrial disclosure of this type of evidence. This Article con-
cludes that, although the prosecution should be able to obtain a
protective order barring discovery in certain exceptional cases, a criminal
defendant ought to be accorded a general right to pretrial discovery of
uncharged misconduct evidence.
I. THE CASE FOR PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF THE PROSECUTION'S
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
Two interests cut strongly in favor of recognizing a defense right to
pretrial discovery of uncharged misconduct evidence: the systemic inter-
est in insuring that the trial judge rules correctly on the admissibility of
the evidence, and the defendant's interest in obtaining a fair trial.
A. Enhancing the Judge's Ability to Rule Correctly on the
Admissibility of Proffered Uncharged Misconduct Evidence
At criminal trials, the uncharged misconduct rule may be the most
frequently misapplied evidentiary doctrine. In many jurisdictions, al-
leged errors in the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence consti-
tute the most common ground for appeal.51 In a large number of states,
written report about the defendant's uncharged misconduct, delivery of that report to the
defense involves less of a burden to the prosecutor than does requesting a copy of the rap
sheet from the F.B.I. Senator McClellan's primary concern was to avoid "burden[ing]
the Government with any substantial new administrative procedure ...." 121 Cong. Rec.
23323 (1975).
49. 8 Moore, supra note 44, 16.04[2], at 16-72 ("no obligation under the Rule to
inform the defendant of any prior misconduct not reflected on the rap sheet... even if
the government intends to introduce it against the defendant at trial.") Moore's treatise
makes it clear that no obligation to disclose exists, even if the prosecution intends to offer
the misconduct under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See 8 Moore, supra note 38, 16.04[2], at 16-
72 & n.64.
50. See 2 Wharton's Criminal Procedure §§ 380-81 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1975).
51. See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence
§ 5239, at 427 (1978) ("There is no question of evidence more frequently litigated in the
appellate courts than the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.").
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errors in the introduction of such evidence account for more reversals of
criminal convictions than any other type of error,52 and the number of
appeals involving allegations of error in admitting uncharged misconduct
evidence is rising.53
This state of affairs is understandable. As previously stated, the un-
charged misconduct doctrine has two prongs. 54 One prong prohibits the
prosecutor from using the defendant's other crimes to support a general
inference of the defendant's bad character. 5 The other prong permits
the prosecutor to offer testimony about the other crimes on noncharacter
theories of logical relevance to the trial such as identity, plan, and mo-
tive.56 To apply the rule, the trial judge must differentiate between char-
acter and noncharacter theories of relevance. Both commentators 57 and
courts58 have complained that the line between inadmissible character
evidence and legitimate uncharged misconduct evidence can be fine.
Denial of pretrial discovery of the prosecutor's uncharged misconduct
evidence increases the likelihood that the trial judge will err in drawing
the line between character and noncharacter evidence. If the prosecution
springs the evidence on the defense for the first time at trial, the defense's
only recourse may be to object in general terms that the evidence
amounts to proof of bad character or that the evidence is unduly prejudi-
cial. Faced with general objections, the prosecutor may only need to in-
voke a vague theory of relevance to insure admission. For example,
when the defendant may have committed recent crimes similar to the
charged offense, prosecutors often cite the plan theory for admitting un-
charged misconduct.5 9 Other prosecutors incant res gestae as their the-
ory of admissibility if the charged and uncharged crimes occurred at
roughly the same time.'o Under such circumstances, not only must the
trial judge rule on the spur of the moment, but he must do so based on
only general objections and vague theories of relevance. The prosecutor's
52. See State v. Moore, 108 Ariz. 215, 218, 495 P.2d 445, 448 (1972); Case Note,
Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Exception: State v. Treadway, 1978 Ariz. St. L.J.
153, 156 n.29 (citing State v. Moore).
53. See Comment, The Jurisprudence of Similar Acts Evidence in the Eighth Circuit,
48 UMKC L. Rev. 342, 406 (1980).
54. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
55. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
56. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
57. See Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evi-
dence, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 797-98 (1981); Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Con-
duct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 877-79
(1982).
58. See United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
233 (1986); State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 177-78, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967).
59. See Imwinkelried, The Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of the Defendant's
Uncharged Crimes: A Microcosm of the Flaws in the Uncharged Misconduct Doctrine, 50
Mo. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1985).
60. See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence




incantation of a magic formula such as res gestae frequently has an "open
sesame" effect at trial.6 1 Unfortunately, neither the uncharged crime's
similarity to the charged crime nor the temporal coincidence of the
crimes guarantees that the uncharged crime has genuine logical relevance
on a noncharacter theory.62
There are signs that the appellate courts will no longer permit impre-
cise analysis of uncharged misconduct issues at the trial level. Some
courts have tightened the foundational requirements of the plan theory
by holding that mere similarity between the charged and uncharged of-
fenses does not establish the existence of a plan tying all the crimes to-
gether.63 These courts will not permit the prosecutor to hide behind the
ambiguity of the term "plan." Rather, they insist that the prosecutor
precisely articulate a noncharacter theory of logical relevance." Other
courts have repudiated the res gestae theory.65
If the appellate courts demand more meticulous analysis of uncharged
misconduct issues at trial, the trial judges will have to subject the prose-
cution's evidence to more rigorous logical relevance analysis than they
have in the past.66 In one decision, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia strongly encouraged prosecutors to disclose their uncharged
misconduct to the defense before trial.67 In so doing, the court empha-
sized that pretrial disclosure would benefit the trial judge as well as the
defendant .6  Due to "the complexity of [the] questions" confronting the
trial judge and "the ease of confusion of permissible with impermissible
inferences,"' 69 allowing the trial judge to hear more specific arguments
would result in a more informed decision. Hence, the trial bench would
be one of the beneficiaries of a general rule requiring pretrial disclosure of
the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence.
61. See Slough, Other Vices; Other Crimes." Kansas Statutes Annotated Section 60-455
Revisted, 26 U. Kan. L. Rev. 161, 166-67 (1978); Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: An
Evidentiary Dilemma, 20 U. Kan. L. Rev. 411, 417 (1972).
62. See Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, I Crim. Just. 6, 45-46 (Sum. 1986).
63. See eg., United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Rappaport, 22 M.J. 445, 447 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Brannan, 18 MJ.
181, 183 (C.M.A. 1984); United States v. Logan, 18 M.J. 606, 608 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984);
People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 632-34, 685 P.2d 1126, 1141-43, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775,
788-90 (1984); People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 89, 679 P.2d 1, 7-8, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567,
574 (1984); Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 310 (D.C. App. 1987); State v. Bowen, 48
Wash. App. 187, 738 P.2d 316, 319-20 (1987).
64. See cases cited supra note 63.
65. United States v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1987).
66. See Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 22.
67. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 526 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (disclosure of






B. The Defense's Ability to Object Successfully to or Rebut the
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence at Trial
Although the trial bench has something to gain from a rule requiring
pretrial disclosure of uncharged misconduct evidence, the defendant ob-
viously would be the major beneficiary of such a rule. The question thus
becomes whether the defendant has a bona fide need for pretrial discov-
ery of this type of evidence.
1. General Prerequisites for Pretrial Discovery
The defendant has an acute need for discovery, generally, when the
following conditions concur. The initial condition requires that a denial
of discovery probably would result in surprise at trial.70 The evil to be
avoided is trial by ambush.7" If the prosecution surprises the defense
with inadmissible or unreliable evidence at trial, the defense may be un-
prepared to meet the evidence. Precisely because the defense is not fore-
warned, it may not be forearmed to object to or rebut the evidence.72 If
the defense, however, already possesses the information and notice that
the information will be used at trial, it is unnecessary to require the pros-
ecution to convey the information to the defense. This condition helps
explain the defense's right to pretrial disclosure of the defendant's con-
victions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(B).73 The
convictions relate to criminal transactions other than the one alleged in
the indictment or information. Trial testimony about other occurrences
unfairly surprises the defense.74 The requirement that a denial of discov-
ery will result in trial surprise, therefore, provides the defense with time
to meet the prosecution's evidence without wasting time when discovery
is unnecessary.
The second condition requires that a pretrial opportunity to investigate
the accuracy of the prosecution evidence would be useful to the defense.
This condition helps to rationalize the defendant's right to pretrial dis-
covery of scientific analyses under Rule 16(a)(1)(D). 5 A high incidence
of error exists in scientific analyses,76 and many attorneys lack the scien-
70. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 286.
71. See id.
72. See Everett, supra note 29, at 479-80.
73. See 8 Moore, supra note 44, 1 16.04[2], at 16-71.
74. The prevention of unfair surprise is a particularly weighty consideration in our
system. Some continental countries use a system of "trial by intervals." See Goldstein,
supra note 41, at 1179. In this prosecutorial system, several hearings occur before the
court renders a final adjudication of guilt or innocence. Suppose that at a particular
intermediate hearing, it becomes clear that one side has been surprised by certain evi-
dence offered at that hearing. The opposing side may investigate the evidence before the
next hearing and offer rebuttal evidence then. In contrast, the American system relies on
a single event trial. See id. at 1180. Obviously, pretrial discovery is much more critical in
the American system. See id. at 1179-80.
75. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment.
76. See J. Peterson, E. Fabricant & K. Field, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Research Program (1978); Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC Blind Study, 253 J.
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tific background necessary to evaluate the evidence at first glance. If the
prosecution's scientific analyses remain undisclosed until trial, most de-
fense attorneys would be unable to detect any errors in the report. The
opposing attorney needs a pretrial opportunity to study the report and to
learn enough about the relevant scientific discipline to critique the
report.
7 7
The final prerequisite for pretrial discovery is that the type of evidence
in question is likely to affect the outcome of the case. If the evidence will
prove inconsequential at trial, no compelling need exists to force pretrial
revelation of the evidence. Confessions epitomize the types of evidence
that satisfy this condition. Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey
Supreme Court put it best when he wrote:
We must be mindful of the role of a confession. It frequently becomes
the core of the State's case. It is not uncommon for the judicial pro-
ceeding to become more of a review of what transpired at headquarters
than a trial of the basic criminal event itself. No one would deny a
defendant's right thoroughly to investigate the facts of the crime to
prepare for trial of that event. When a confession is given and issues
surrounding it tend to displace the criminal event as the focus of the
trial, there should be like opportunity to get at the facts of the substi-
tuted issue. Simple justice requires that a defendant be permitted to
prepare to meet what thus looms as the critical element of the case
against him. 78
Thus, when evidence is likely to carry great weight at trial, pretrial dis-
covery is necessary to give the defendant an opportunity to meet the
prosecution's case.
2. Application of the Prerequisites to Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence
The argument for pretrial discovery of uncharged misconduct evidence
is strong because each prerequisite to discovery is satisfied. First, the risk
of surprise unquestionably exists. The same rationale that mandates dis-
closure of convictions under Rule 16(a)(1)(B) requires disclosure of un-
charged misconduct. To withhold convictions from the defense because
the convictions relate to transactions other than the event alleged in the
indictment or information unfairly disadvantages the defense: without
pretrial discovery, the defense might not be alert to the possibility that
those other transactions will come into issue at trial.79 By parity of rea-
Am. Med. Ass'n 2382, 2383 (1985); Peat, Finnigan & Finkle, Proficiency Testing in Fo-
rensic Toxicology: A Feasibility Study, 28 J. Forensic Sci. 139, 152-53 (1983).
77. See Giannelli, Scientific Evidenc" A Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 702,
115 F.R.D. 102, 103 (1987); Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of
Evidence" Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 80
n.162 (1986).
78. State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 137, 145 A.2d 313, 316 (1958), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 933 (1961); Fletcher, supra note 32, at 306-07 (quoting Chief Justice Weintraub).
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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soning, to withhold uncharged misconduct evidence from the defense
also unfairly handicaps the defense. Such evidence is entitled "un-
charged" misconduct because the accusatory pleading makes no mention
of these other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant. Thus, as
with prior conviction evidence, it is unfair to withhold evidence of un-
charged misdeeds from the defense.
Second, the utility of an opportunity for pretrial investigation is like-
wise present. In fact, evidence that amounts to proof of uncharged mis-
conduct satisfies this condition to a much greater degree than evidence
that consists of clearly discoverable information, such as a prior convic-
tion. Where the prosecution, pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(B), makes pre-
trial disclosure of the defendant's convictions, the defense possesses only
limited opportunities for pretrial investigation. In recent years, courts
have tended to liberalize the admissibility of a defendant's prior convic-
tions offered for impeachment.8" In many jurisdictions, some types of
convictions now are admissible automatically. For example, the prevail-
ing view is that if the crime for which the defendant was previously con-
victed "involved dishonesty or false statement" within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), the trial judge must admit that con-
viction.81 Under such circumstances, the judge no longer retains the dis-
cretion to exclude the conviction on the theory that its prejudicial
character outweighs its probative value for impeachment.8 2
Similarly, the defense can do little by way of pretrial investigation to
block or rebut at trial evidence of the conviction. Because the defendant
already has been convicted, a challenge to the validity of the conviction
in the current trial constitutes a collateral attack on the conviction.83
The defendant cannot relitigate whether he committed the crime for
which he was convicted.84 The only collateral attack most courts enter-
tain on the earlier conviction is an argument that the defendant was de-
nied the sixth amendment right to counsel in the earlier trial.85 The only
factual issue worth investigating before trial, therefore, is whether the
defendant was afforded counsel at the trial that culminated in a
conviction.
Pretrial discovery of uncharged misconduct proves much more useful
than pretrial discovery of convictions. In the case of uncharged miscon-
duct, the defense can pursue numerous lines of pretrial factual and legal
investigation. For example, detailed foundation requirements exist for
uncharged misconduct evidence offered on noncharacter theories such as
80. See generally E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Courtroom
Criminal Evidence § 708 (1987) [hereinafter Imwinkelried II].
81. Id. at 198-200 (citing cases).
82. Id. at 199-200.
83. See id. § 708, at 196.
84. See id.
85. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 481 (1972); United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92,
93 n.2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973).
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modus operandi86 and motive.8 7 Assume that the defense obtains pre-
trial disclosure of uncharged misconduct that the prosecution might offer
on the modus operandi theory-that the charged and uncharged crimes
were committed in the same unique manner. Once the defense attorney
learns of the possibility, the attorney can research the massive body of
case law on the question of whether the alleged modus operandi is suffi-
ciently distinctive to be probative of the defendant's identity as the perpe-
trator of the charged crime.88
Just as the opportunity for pretrial legal research can prove useful to
the defense, so too the opportunity for pretrial factual investigation can
prove valuable to the defense. An essential part of the foundation for an
offer of uncharged misconduct evidence consists of proof that the defend-
ant committed the uncharged act.89 In the last decade, a number ofjuris-
dictions have relaxed the standard for proving the defendant's
commission of the uncharged act. For example, many federal circuits
have ruled that the prosecution's evidence suffices if it would support a
rational jury finding-a permissive inference-of the defendant's identity
as the person who committed the uncharged act." This rule makes it
easier for prosecutors to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence, but
it also means that the prosecution's foundational proof of the defendant's
identity may be weak and easily rebuttable. As discussed above, if the
prosecution offers a conviction against the defendant, the defendant's
only permissible factual attack may be proof that the defendant was de-
nied counsel at the earlier trial. When the prosecution offers an act of
uncharged misconduct, however, the defense is entitled to introduce any
evidence to show that the act did not occur or that the defendant did not
commit the act.
The final condition-the importance of the type of evidence the de-
fense seeks to discover-also exists when the defense probes for un-
86. See Imwinkelried I, supra note 3, at §§ 3:10-:14. For example, the prosecution
may have to establish not only that the crimes were committed in a similar fashion but
also that the manner is so unique that only one criminal is likely to employ that modus.
See id.
87. Id. at §§ 3:15-:17. Suppose, for instance, that the prosecutor's theory is that the
defendant killed the victim because the victim knew of another crime committed by the
defendant and could have reported that crime to the police. Some cases require the pros-
ecutor to show both that the victim knew of the other crime and that the defendant knew
of the victim's knowledge. See id.
88. I4 at §§ 3:12-:14.
89. See e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) (relevancy conditioned on fact); Cal. Evid. Code
§ 403(a)(4) (1987) ("The proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of produc-
ig evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact... [when] [t]he proffered evidence
is of ... conduct of a particular person and the preliminary fact is whether that person
... so conducted himself.. ").
90. See United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 234-35 (1st Cir. 1987); United
States v. Martin, 773 F.2d 579, 582 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d
1277, 1280 (1lth Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983); United States v.




charged misconduct evidence in the prosecution's possession. In a case
such as Williams or von Bulow, the uncharged misconduct evidence can
have an impact comparable to that of a confession, which is discoverable
as of right under Rule 16(a)(1)(A). Indeed, in Williams, the evidence of
the other ten killings patently formed the cornerstone of the prosecu-
tion's case.91
Uncharged misconduct satisfies the condition of the importance of the
evidence to a greater degree than does conviction evidence. Uncharged
misconduct evidence is more prejudicial to the defense in both the practi-
cal and the technical sense of that term. In the practical sense, uncharged
misconduct is more harmful to the defense because a judge may admit a
conviction only to impeach the defendant's credibility.92 On defense re-
quest, the judge must give the jury a limiting instruction that they may
consider the conviction only in evaluating the defendant's believability.93
Moreover, the defendant's credibility as a witness does not come into
issue until the defendant takes the witness stand.94 Consequently, the
prosecution typically cannot broach the subject of the conviction until
the cross-examination of the defendant; and if the defendant elects not to
testify, the conviction cannot be mentioned at all.
Because similar restrictions do not limit its impact, uncharged miscon-
duct evidence can be more damaging. The prosecutor may use un-
charged misconduct as proof of the historical merits of the case such as
the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged crime95 or the
defendant's possession of the mens rea needed for the charged crime.96
During closing argument, the prosecutor may treat the uncharged mis-
conduct as substantive proof of guilt.97 In addition, the prosecutor usu-
ally is entitled to offer the uncharged misconduct during the
government's case-in-chief 9g-before the defendant testifies and even if
the defendant does not testify. 99
Increased potential for prejudice also exists in the technical sense of
the term. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence
403 explains that in the formal evidentiary sense, prejudice means the
tendency of the evidence to tempt the jury to decide the case on an im-
91. See Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 783-85, 312 S.E.2d 40, 70-71 (1984); State v.
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 137, 145 A.2d 313, 316 (1958) (confession "frequently becomes the
core of the State's case"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933 (1961).
92. See Fed. R. Evid. 609.
93. See Fed. R. Evid. 105.
94. See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 33 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
95. See generally Imwinkelried I, supra note 3, at ch. 3.
96. See generally id. at ch. 5.
97. The prosecutor may utilize the uncharged misconduct evidence in summation so
long as he operates within standards of ethical conduct, does not use inflammatory de-
scriptions, and does not misuse the evidence as evidence of bad character. See id. at
§ 9:68.




proper basis." ° Conviction evidence poses a danger of prejudice in this
sense."° ' The jury might disregard the judge's limiting instructions and
misuse the credibility evidence as evidence on the merits; the jurors may
be tempted to reason that if the defendant committed one crime in the
past, he or she is more likely to have committed the offense now being
tried. Uncharged misconduct presents the very same danger. Once
again, the jury may be inclined to treat the evidence as proof of the de-
fendant's general bad character.10
2
The risk of prejudice is compounded, however, in the case of un-
charged misconduct evidence because another danger arises. If the de-
fendant has not been convicted of the uncharged act, the jury may leap to
the conclusion that the defendant unjustly has escaped punishment for
that act.'0o The jurors subconsciously may be tempted to correct that
perceived injustice by punishing the defendant for that earlier crime,
even though they have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt of
the charged crime."° Therefore, uncharged misconduct evidence creates
a graver risk of a guilty verdict on an improper basis than conviction
evidence poses.
In summary, the three conditions that determine whether a defendant
has a bona fide need for pretrial discovery all are present when the de-
fense requests disclosure of the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evi-
dence. Denying the defense discovery easily can result in surprise at
trial. If surprised, the defense may be woefully unprepared to meet
otherwise inadmissible or rebuttable evidence. Such evidence may not
only prove likely to sway the jury; it also may influence the jury to con-
vict the defendant on an improper basis. In short, the defendant's inabil-
ity to discover uncharged misconduct can pose a tremendous obstacle to
100. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note.
101. See People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 514, 268 N.E.2d 695, 697 (1971)
(" 'The defendant is a dead duck once he is on trial before a jury and you present a record
that he was convicted .... If it's any way close, the jury is going to hang him on that
record, not on the evidence.' "); Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021
(1965); Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18 DePaul
L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1968); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide On Guilt, 9 Law & Human Bch. 37, 45
(1985).
102. See United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Except
in unusual circumstances, emanations from evidence of a defendant's bad acts are almost
always suggestive of a defendant's propensity to commit other bad or criminal acts ....
and errors in admitting such evidence consequently often go to the fundamental fairness
of the trial.").
103. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 920 (1979); see also Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other
Crimes Evidence" A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 556, 561 (1984) (ju-
rors may subconsciously desire to "sanction the defendant for another crime he seems to
have 'got[ten] away with' "); Williams, The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence, 5 Dalhou-
sie L.J. 281, 289 (1979) (" 'tendency to condemn... because [the defendant] has escaped
unpunished from other offences.'" quoting I Wigmore on Evidence 650 (3d ed. 1940)).
104. See Sharpe, supra note 103, at 561-62.
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a fair trial.105 This part has shown that pretrial discovery of uncharged
misconduct would improve markedly the trial judge's ability to rule cor-
rectly on the complex issues raised by uncharged misconduct evidence.
Coupled with this improved ability, the defense's acute need for pretrial
discovery of uncharged misconduct completes a powerful case for
amending Rule 16 to guarantee a right to such discovery.
II. THE OBJECTIONS TO PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF THE
PROSECUTION'S UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
Thus far, this Article has discussed only the factors favoring pretrial
discovery of uncharged misconduct evidence. It now turns to counter-
vailing considerations-potential objections to a proposal to entitle the
defendant to discover uncharged misconduct evidence before trial. A
number of frequently voiced objections exist.
A. Pretrial Discovery Would Facilitate Perjury by Defense Witnesses
One criticism asserts that pretrial revelation of uncharged misconduct
evidence will facilitate the defense's ability to fabricate perjured testi-
mony to rebut the prosecution's evidence.' 06 If the defense learns the
tenor of the proposed prosecution testimony before trial, he or she will
possess greater opportunity to prepare effective perjury by defense
witnesses. 107
In his classic article on criminal discovery, Justice Brennan dubbed the
perjury argument "the old hobgoblin."' ' To be sure, pretrial disclosure
of the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence will pave the way
for defense perjury in some cases. It does not follow, however, that, on
balance, this danger warrants denying the defense the right to discover
105. See Everett, supra note 29, at 479-80; Fletcher, supra note 32, at 303.
106. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 289.
107. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 309-11. This objection overlooks the coexistent
need to deter perjury by prosecution witnesses. The prosecution's witnesses to uncharged
crimes are sometimes the defendant's alleged accomplices. See, e.g., United States v.
Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 513 (10th Cir. 1984) (prosecution's case consisted entirely of
uncorroborated accomplice testimony). The accomplice may be an inveterate liar. See
Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1165-66 (1954). When the accomplice appears
to testify to the defendant's uncharged misconduct, the accomplice may have a plea bar-
gain pending with the prosecution, giving the accomplice a strong motivation to curry
favor with the prosecution. Defense discovery would deter pejury by this type of prose-
cution witness. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 308-09.
To improve his standing with the prosecutor, the accomplice might also give pejurious
trial testimony even more favorable to the prosecution than that contained in the pretrial
statement. If the accomplice knew, however, that the defense had obtained a copy of the
statement, the accomplice would think twice; the accomplice would realize that the de-
fense is in a better position to expose any perjurious trial testimony.
108. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 291; accord Fletcher, supra note 32, at 309 (refer-
ring to perjury argument as "bugaboo"); Rice, Criminal Defense Discovery: A Prelude to
Justice or an Interlude for Abuse?, 45 Miss. L.J. 887, 896 (1974) (characterizing perjury
argument as "a modem day Trojan horse within the gates of justice").
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the evidence. The magnitude of the problem of defense perjury is largely
unknown. Little tangible proof of the extent of the problem exists." 9
Essentially the same argument was made when the drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure proposed liberalizing discovery in civil
cases.' 10 Opponents issued a dire forecast that freer discovery inevitably
would result in widespread perjury.1 11 The drafters rejected the argu-
ment, and the forecast certainly has not come to pass:1" 2 no discernible
increase in the incidence of perjury in civil cases has occurred. 1 3 In the
few states that have implemented liberal criminal discovery, the experi-
ence has been similar. 4 One former state's attorney remarked that the
experience in his state shows that the fear of a dramatic increase in de-
fense perjury is "imaginary."'1 15
Further, the denial of pretrial discovery constitutes a particularly inef-
fective means of preventing defense witness perjury. A criminal trial
usually proceeds in the following order: the prosecution case-in-chief,
the defense case-in-chief, the prosecution rebuttal, and, last, the defense
surrebuttal or rejoinder.' 6 The denial of pretrial discovery prevents per-
jury effectively in only two situations. If the defense witnesses testified in
the defense case-in-chief and the prosecution presented its witnesses' tes-
timony in rebuttal, the defense witnesses would have to commit to a ver-
sion of the facts before hearing the prosecution testimony. The
opportunity to prepare perjured testimony, therefore, would be limited
greatly. The denial of discovery also would practically foreclose defense
perjury when the defense witnesses testify immediately after the prosecu-
tion's uncharged misconduct witnesses. The defense witnesses would not
have the time to tailor their perjury.
In practice, however, the prosecutor usually calls the uncharged mis-
conduct witnesses during the prosecution case-in-chief.11 7 Often, consid-
erable delay occurs between the prosecution testimony and the
contradictory testimony of the defense witnesses called during the de-
fense case-in-chief, allowing defense witnesses a substantial period of
time to manufacture perjury. Similarly, the dangers of perjury and wit-
109. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 290 n.39 ("What meager statistical evidence there
is suggests that perjury is a very slight danger indeed."); Fletcher, supra note 32, at 310
(risk of defense perjury an "unverified assertion").
110. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 308.
111. See Rice, supra note 108, at 896 (summarizing opponents' arguments).
112. See id. (opponents' claims of increased perjury, among others, "have never been
substantiated as a genuine cause for alarm"); Note, supra note 41, at 806-07
("[E]xperience in the civil arena has proven that broad discovery does not encourage...
perjury but rather results in better preparation and more... effective cross-examma-
tion.") (citation omitted).
113. See Rice, supra note 108, at 897.
114. See Hewitt & Bell, supra note 41, at 244 ("no dire effects").
115. See Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A. J. 732,
734 (1967).
116. See Imwinkelried II, supra note 80, at § 102.
117. See Imwinkelried I, supra note 3, at § 9:23.
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ness intimidation are greatest in organized crime prosecutions" 8 because
the trials in these prosecutions tend to be complex and lengthy. Fre-
quently a delay of days, weeks, or months occurs between the prosecu-
tion uncharged misconduct testimony and the defense's contradictory
testimony. In addition, if the uncharged misconduct evidence surprises
the defense, the defense may seek a mid-trial continuance. 1 9 The Advi-
sory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 emphasizes that
when surprise occurs at trial, "the granting of a continuance is a[n]...
appropriate remedy."'"2 In sum, a denial of pretrial discovery will not
foreclose defense perjury; in the cases in which the threat of defense per-
jury is heightened, a defendant so inclined frequently will have more than
enough time during the trial to recruit and coach potential perjurers.
B. It Is Unfair to Require Prosecutors to Commit Themselves to a
Theory of Logical Relevance Before Trial
Although in most jurisdictions defendants have no right to pretrial dis-
covery of uncharged misconduct evidence,' 2' a number of states have
gone to the opposite extreme. In these states, even absent a defense dis-
covery motion, the prosecution must disclose sua sponte any uncharged
misconduct evidence that it intends to offer at trial. 22 Most of these
states also require that the prosecution simultaneously indicate the the-
ory or theories of noncharacter relevance that it contemplates using at
trial. "'23 In von Bulow, for instance, the prosecution would have had to
divulge both the content of Mrs. Isles' testimony and its intent to rely on
the motive theory of admissibility.
Prosecutors complain that it is unfair to require them to commit to a
theory of logical relevance before trial. Although there is no conclusive
evidence that this complaint is well-founded, 24 common sense suggests
that it has merit. Uncharged misconduct evidence is so prejudicial that
most courts permit the prosecution to resort to the evidence only upon a
showing of a bona fide need.' 2 5 Suppose that the defendant in a murder
118. See infra text accompanying note 139.
119. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); United States v. Carr, 764
F.2d 496, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); United States v.
Lingo, 740 F.2d 667, 668 (8th Cir. 1984).
120. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note.
121. See Imwinkelried I, supra note 3, § 9:06.
122. See State v. Acquin, 34 Conn. Supp. 152, 381 A.2d 239 (Super. Ct. 1977); DeVane
v. State, 183 Ga. App. 60, 357 S.E.2d 819 (1987); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La.
1973); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965); State v. Just, 184 Mont.
262, 602 P.2d 957 (1979); Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Fla.
Stat. § 90.404 (1986); see also G. Joseph, S. Saltzburg, Evidence in America, ch. 14, at 7-8
(1987).
123. See Note, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 535,
546-52 (1974).
124. See id. at 551 & n. 115 (questionnaires sent to prosecutors in Louisiana and Min-
nesota). The author calls for further empirical studies. Id. at 551-52.




case admits at trial that she killed the decedent but claims to have done
so in self-defense. Given the posture of the case, there is no justification
for a prosecution offer of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove her
identity as the killer. Before trial, however, it may be difficult for the
prosecutor to foresee whether a genuine need for uncharged misconduct
evidence will arise. The prosecutor may have difficulty predicting which
issues the defense intends to controvert and, hence, which facts the pros-
ecutor may need the uncharged misconduct to prove. The need may
even arise between the prosecution's revelation of the existence of the
uncharged misconduct evidence and the beginning of the prosecution
case-in-chief. A defense attorney's statement during an intervening pre-
trial conference,126 jury selection, 127 or opening statement 128 may be the
first indication that the defense intends to dispute an issue such as iden-
tity at trial. Forcing the prosecution to elect a theory of relevance before
trial, therefore, seems premature. Unlike the perjury hobgoblin, this
prosecution objection has substance.
The unfairness to the prosecution, however, does not arise from the
requirement for pretrial revelation itself. Rather, the distinct require-
ment that the prosecutor simultaneously specify a theory of logical rele-
vance for offering the uncharged misconduct generates the unfairness.
This Article urges the adoption of the former requirement without the
latter. The prosecution's revelation of the existence and tenor of its un-
charged misconduct evidence ordinarily will satisfy the defendant's dis-
covery needs. Although Rule 16 allows the defense to discover several
types of prosecution evidence as of right, nowhere does it impose an obli-
gation that the prosecution elect a theory of admissibility before trial. 2 9
The prosecution may have to disclose an item of physical evidence under
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) or a scientific report under Rule 16(a)(1)(D), but the
prosecution has no duty to indicate specifically how it intends to use the
item or report at trial. No cogent reason exists to single out uncharged
misconduct evidence by mandating both pretrial disclosure and pretrial
election. Once a competent defense attorney learns the tenor of the pros-
ecution evidence, the attorney usually can identify the most probable
trial uses of the evidence. Having identified those uses, the defense attor-
ney can conduct any factual investigation or legal research necessary in
anticipation of trial.
The majority of jurisdictions deny the defense the right to pretrial dis-
covery of the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence.' 3 This Ar-
126. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), cert denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); Hall, The Trial of a Recidivist and Proof of
Other Crimes, Case & Comment 46, 49 (Sep. - Oct. 1979).
127. See Hall, supra note 126, at 49.
128. See United States v. Badolato, 710 F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Olsen, 589 F.2d 351, 352 (8th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979);
United States v. Cohen, 489 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1973).
129. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
130. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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title does not call for the adoption of the drastic, minority view that the
prosecutor must disclose sua sponte uncharged misconduct and commit
to a theory of admissibility before trial. Rather, recognizing the validity
of this prosecution objection, this Article recommends only the modest
reform that the defense be granted a general right to discover uncharged
misconduct evidence.
C. Pretrial Disclosure of the Identity of the Prosecution's Uncharged
Misconduct Witnesses Will Lead to Witness Intimidation
One objection remains, even to the modest reform proposed in this
Article. The objection embodies the fear that if the defense learns the
identity of the prosecution's witnesses before trial, the defense will har-
ass, intimidate, and threaten those witnesses. Witness intimidation im-
perils the public interest as well as the individual witness. If it becomes
common knowledge that many criminal defendants harass the prospec-
tive prosecution witnesses, potential witnesses will be reluctant to come
forward."' Eyewitnesses to crimes will remain silent out of fear of
reprisal. 132
Both courts 133 and prosecutors 134 have expressed their concern that
pretrial disclosure of the identity of prosecution witnesses would lead to
assaults against, and bribery of, potential witnesses. During its 1974-75
session, Congress held hearings on a Supreme Court proposal to amend
Rule 16 to require the prosecution to disclose the identity of its wit-
nesses.1 35 The Justice Department denounced the proposal. The De-
partment representative testified that the proposal was "dangerous and
frightening in that government witnesses and their families will even be
more exposed than they now are to threats, pressures, and physical
harm."' 136 The conference committee subsequently deleted the proposal
from the 1975 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act. 137 In explaining its
131. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 289; Everett, supra note 29, at 478.
132. See Rice, supra note 108, at 901.
133. The classic court statement of that fear was voiced in State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203,
210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) ("Another result of full discovery would be that the crimi-
nal defendant who is informed of the names of all of the State's witnesses may take steps
to bribe or frighten them.., so that they are unavailable to testify."). See also Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 66-67 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting) (discussing importance of
government's policy of not disclosing identities of informants); United States v. Estep,
151 F. Supp. 668, 672-73 (N.D. Tex. 1957) (informers' identities must be protected to
ensure testimony and conviction), aff'd, 251 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1958).
134. See Louisell II, supra note 31, at 928.
135. See H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 674, 684; see also 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure § 254, at 86-88 (1982) (discussing the House Judici-
ary and Conference Committee Reports); 3A Wright, supra, at app. nn. 117-19 (relevant
portions of the congressional committee reports).
136. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 674, 712.
137. H. Conf. Rep. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 713, 716.
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action, the committee stated that "[d]iscouragement of witnesses and im-
proper contacts directed at influencing their testimony, were deemed par-
amount concerns ... 138
These concerns are substantial. It is a commonplace observation that
the concern over witness intimidation is justified when the defendant is a
member of an organized crime syndicate.1 39 Even if the defendant is in
jail, other members of the syndicate may be at large, and their syndicate
membership evidences their willingness to violate the law. Moreover, as-
suming that the extent of discovery currently authorized by Rule 16 is
unobjectionable, one still consistently can oppose pretrial discovery of
the identities of prosecution witnesses. Rules 16(a)(1)(A)-(D) permit dis-
covery of the defendant's confessions, the defendant's prior record, phys-
ical objects, and scientific reports." None of these types of evidence
creates a significant danger of witness intimidation.' Only the remotest
possibility exists that the defendant will attempt to alter a physical object
or an FBI rap sheet, and the only prosecution witnesses of a confession
or about a scientific analysis may be police personnel. The danger of
witness intimidation is much greater when the defense seeks the identity
of private citizen witnesses,' 42 such as eyewitnesses to the defendant's
uncharged misconduct.
In the past, despite these plausible prosecution arguments, most com-
mentators have concluded that the spectre of witness intimidation forms
an insufficient basis for limiting criminal discovery.' They have dis-
missed the spectre as "imaginary"'" and "factually unsubstantiated."'4 5
Although prosecutors had made many polemic statements about the
problem of witness intimidation,'" there was little empirical evidence
that the problem was a sizeable one. There were only scattered reports of
cases of defense harassment of prosecution witnesses. 47 Many states
138. I&
139. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 294-95 & n.49; Krantz, supra note 30, at 134;
Louisell I, supra note 30, at 99; Louisell II, supra note 31, at 932-33; Norton, supra note
32, at 14; Traynor, supra note 41, at 244 & n.87; Note, Discovery of Witness Identity
Under Preliminary Proposed Federal Criminal Rule 16, 12 Wm. & Mary L Rev. 603, 621
(1971).
140. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(D).
141. See Everett, supra note 29, at 506-08; Rice, supra note 108, at 898-901.
142. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 314.
143. See Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A. J. 732,
734 (1967); Rice, supra note 108, at 901-02; Traynor, supra note 41, at 228-29.
144. See Langrock, supra note 143, at 734.
145. See Rice, supra note 108, at 902.
146. See Note, supra note 41, at 803-10.
147. 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure § 252, at 36 n.3 (a survey of 14 prosecutors conducted by the Junior Bar Section of
the Bar Association of the District of Columbia in 1963 revealed 10 prosecutors claimed
personal experience with problems of witness intimidation); Note, supra note 139, at 622
n.90 (citing Bergan Drug Co. v. Parke Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962) and
House of Materials Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962), as "two
extreme cases involving witness intimidation").
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now require the prosecution to disclose the identity of its trial wit-
nesses, 148 and yet no concrete evidence showing a rise in the frequency of
witness intimidation in those jurisdictions exists. 149
The problem of witness intimidation, however, no longer can be dis-
missed so casually. In 1985, Profesor Michael Graham released his
book, Witness Intimidation: The Law's Response.150 There, Professor
Graham points out that the available data indicates that the problem of
witness intimidation arises in only a minority of cases.1 51 The data con-
vinces him, however, that "thousands of examples" of witness harass-
ment exist.152 He cites a Department of Justice study "list[ing] ... more
than 700 instances of witness intimidation ranging from assault to assas-
sination," '53 the problem being worst in organized crime cases. 154 An-
other Justice Department study found that "10 percent of all murders
related to organized crime in a four-year period were of prosecution wit-
nesses." '155 Evidently, neither Department study contained a detailed dis-
cussion of the manner in which it collected data, but as official
documents, the studies possess a measure of credibility. Even if the 700
and 10 percent figures are somewhat overstated, the figures are startling
enough to support Professor Graham's conclusion that the problem is a
serious one. 16
In light of Professor Graham's research, it no longer remains possible
for the proponents of expanded criminal discovery to brush aside prose-
cutors' concerns over witness intimidation. Even accepting the Justice
Department figures at face value, however, it is inappropriate to rush to
the conclusion that the risk of witness intimidation makes it unwise to
liberalize the discovery available to criminal defendants. Section II.A of
this Article discussed the prosecutors' contention that liberalized discov-
ery will facilitate perjury by defense witnesses rebutting the prosecution's
uncharged misconduct evidence. It noted the fallacy of this contention.
Denying the defendant pretrial discovery of uncharged misconduct
serves as an ineffective means of preventing defense perjury because the
defense often has a substantial time period during trial to ready its per-
jury, even absent the advantage of discovery. A similar fallacy is to be
found in assuming that the denial of pretrial discovery of uncharged mis-
148. See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.3(f), at 491-92 (1984);
Note, Defendant Access to Prosecution Witness Statements in Federal and State Criminal
Cases, 61 Wash. U.L.Q. 471, 487, 501-02 (1983).
149. See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 148, § 19.3, at 481; Shatz, supra note 34,
at 295-96; Discovery: Eliminating Anachronistic Limitations Imposed on the Defendant, 9
U.S.F. L. Rev. 259, 295-96 (1974).
150. M. Graham, Witness Intimidation: The Law's Response (1985).
151. See id. at 50 (citing ABA, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, Standards for
Criminal Justice (2d ed. 1980)).
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 4.
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conduct eliminates the possibility of defense intimidation of the prosecu-
tion witnesses to the uncharged misconduct. Indeed, the danger of
witness intimidation "exists with or without discovery. If the case is im-
portant enough for perjury, intimidation or bribery, it is important
enough for the defendant to employ the means necessary to ascertain the
identity of Government witnesses. Discovery is not needed."' 57 If the
defendant is willing to threaten or bribe prosecution witnesses, the de-
fendant may be equally willing to resort to the bribery, extortion, or
threats to learn the prosecution witnesses' identities. Denying the de-
fendant pretrial discovery is not a panacea for the problem of witness
intimidation.
Further, the judge has procedures available to him or her to reduce the
risk of intimidation that are less drastic than a complete bar to defense
discovery.158 Rather than denying defense discovery altogether, the
judge can use the "scalpel" of a protective order.'59 Initially, the prose-
cution would seek an order denying the defense the identity of the wit-
ness it intends to call to establish the defendant's uncharged misconduct.
Under the protective order procedure, the prosecutor then would make a
showing to the judge at an in camera hearing; and the transcript of the
hearing could be sealed for appeal."6 The prosecution would have the
burden'61 of proving that objective indications' 62 exist of a threat to the
safety of the prosecution's uncharged misconduct witnesses. The burden
imposed on the prosecution, however, should not be unduly heavy. 63
Given the gravity of the problem of witness intimidation, it would be
unsound to grant protective orders only when the prosecution can
demonstrate that the defendant already has threatened witnesses in the
case. Arguably, the prosecution should also be entitled to an order if it
can demonstrate that the defendant or an at-large accomplice has a past
record for violence.
The protective order procedure safeguards the prosecution's interests
while providing more discovery than the defense currently receives in
most jurisdictions. The procedure should certainly afford the prosecu-
tion's interests ample protection. The protective order procedure re-
quires the judge to differentiate between the run-of-the-mill case and the
exceptional prosecution in which a realistic danger of witness harassment
exists."6 Judges routinely make similar determinations in bail hear-
157. Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 91 (1963);
see also 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure § 252, at 39 n.9 (2d ed. 1982) (quoting Pye, supra).
158. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 292; Norton, supra note 32, at 14-15.
159. See Shatz, supra note 134, at 296.
160. See Everett, supra note 29, at 502.
161. See Louisell II, supra note 31, at 935-36.
162. See id. at 934.
163. See Krantz, supra note 30, at 134; 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 148, § 19.3,
at 479.
164. See Louisell I, supra note 30, at 100.
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ings. 165 Moreover, the experience with protective orders in jurisdictions
otherwise permitting liberal discovery indicates that most judges are so-
licitous of the prosecution's interest in protecting its witnesses. One
prosecutor commented that "[w]hen violence is feared, the courts usually
acquiesce in nondisclosure. "166 Another prosecutor remarked that, in
his judgment, the protective order procedure had not led to "any un-
towards results."1 67 When objective "circumstances warrant[ing]" a fear
that prosecution witnesses would be subjected to harassment were estab-
lished, the judges "excused [the prosecution] from discovery., 16  The
bench's receptivity to prosecution motions for protective orders helps to
ensure the safety of the prosecution's uncharged misconduct witnesses
under the proposed expanded discovery rule.169 It is true that the protec-
tive order procedure does not eliminate the possibility of witness intimi-
dation. Balanced against the defense's pressing need for discovery,
however, this speculative possibility supplies an insufficient basis for de-
nying the defense discovery. 170
Even when the judge issues an order denying pretrial discovery of the
identity of the prosecution's uncharged misconduct witnesses, the de-
fense can obtain more discovery than it now receives in the majority of
jurisdictions. A protective order can specify the fact or facts to be with-
held from the defense before trial.1 7' Thus, while denying the defense the
identity of the witness, the judge still could order the prosecution to di-
vulge to the defense all the other circumstances surrounding the alleged
uncharged misconduct: the date, time, place, and manner of commission
of the act. As in the case of the evidentiary privilege for an informer's
identity, 172 the only fact that must be suppressed is the identity of the
165. See id. at 101; Louisell II, supra note 31, at 935.
166. Miller, The Omnibus Hearing-An Experiment in Federal Criminal Discovery, 5
San Diego L. Rev. 293, 308 (1968).
167. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 674, 686 (remarks of the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of California, concerning modifications to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16).
168. Id.
169. Note, supra note 41, at 830.
170. Some might argue that the availability of the protective order procedure should
justify granting the defense general access to the prosecution's investigative file. This
Article, however, stops short of calling for such a result.
In determining whether to grant the defense discovery of a particular type of evidence,
the competing interests must be balanced. The defense has an especially strong interest in
discovering uncharged misconduct evidence: there is a significant risk of unfair surprise
at trial, that the evidence is potent enough to change the outcome of the case, and that the
changed outcome may be a wrongful conviction. See supra text accompanying notes 15-
28. Weighed against a conjectural possibility of witness harassment, this defense interest
seems overriding. The balance of interests might have to be struck differently, however, if
the defense seeks a different type of evidence. There might be less risk of surprise, the
evidence might be less likely to affect the trial outcome, and there might be much less
chance of convicting the innocent.
171. See 9 Federal Procedure, L. Ed., Criminal Procedure § 22:663, at 289 (1982).
172. See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 111 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); Im-
winkelried II, supra note 80, at § 1710.
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potential witness. With knowledge of the other details, the defense can
take appropriate steps to prepare for trial. The defense can attempt to
locate witnesses to establish the defendant's alibi for the time of the un-
charged act and can conduct any legal research needed to determine
whether the charged and uncharged acts are sufficiently similar to satisfy
the foundational requirements for the modus operandi theory of admissi-
bility. In some cases, the protective order might even compel the prose-
cution to divulge the identity of the alleged victim of the uncharged
crime when the witness fearful of harassment is a person other than the
victim. Notwithstanding the protective order for the witness' identity, a
well-drafted protective order would leave the defense in a much better
position to meet the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence at
trial.
CONCLUSION
This Article recommends a modest change in the law of criminal dis-
covery. The heart of the recommendation lies in the notion that criminal
defendants generally should have a right to obtain pretrial discovery of
the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence. The recommended
duty to produce uncharged misconduct evidence would attach to any in-
cident of uncharged misconduct that the prosecution intends to prove at
trial,17 3 whether the prosecution information about the incident takes the
form of a witness' oral report, a rap sheet entry, or a judgment of convic-
tion. 174 The defendant's right to pretrial discovery should be limited to
173. Some defense attorneys undoubtedly would argue that the duty to produce evi-
dence of uncharged misconduct should attach to any incident of uncharged misconduct
known to the prosecution and that the automatic sanction for violating the duty should
be the exclusion of the evidence at trial. This argument, however, seems too sweeping.
The prosecution's failure to divulge the incident before trial might be excusable. To
begin with, the prosecution might not discover the incident until after trial begins. Alter-
natively, although the prosecution knew of the incident before trial, at that time, the
prosecution might not have foreseen any need to resort to the evidence at trial. See supra
text accompanying notes 125-27. The prosecution might be able to show that a turn of
events at trial (1) was unforeseeable and (2) now requires the prosecution to employ the
uncharged misconduct at trial. In civil actions, when one party moves for sanctions for
violation of a discovery order, the judge often must determine whether the other party's
technical violation of a discovery order was excusable E. Imwinkelried & T. Blumoff,
Pretrial Discovery: Strategy & Tactics § 13:18 (1986).
Even if the judge concludes that the prosecution's failure to disclose the incident was
excusable, the judge can grant the defense some relief. The unanticipated turn of events
will usually occur during the defense case-in-chief. The prosecution's next opportunity to
present witnesses, therefore, arises during the prosecution rebuttal. The judge can grant
the defense a recess or continuance to investigate the alleged incident. It also may be
proper to say that, in light of the unforeseen development, the prosecution should be
permitted to introduce evidence about the uncharged incident. It would be unfair, how-
ever, to say that the defense must question the prosecution's uncharged misconduct wit-
nesses without an opportuntiy to prepare for cross-examination.
174. The diverse forms of information falling with the new rule should not pose any
serious administrative problems in implementing it. Under the current Fed. R. Crim. P.
16, prosecutors are accustomed to processing discovery requests for these various types of
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that type of evidence, and should be qualified further by the prosecutor's
right to protective orders forbidding discovery of the identity of their
uncharged misconduct witnesses whenever realistic indicia of a threat of
witness intimidation exist. This recommendation represents a compro-
mise, attempting to accommodate the legitimate interests of both the
prosecution and the defense.
Like many attempted compromises in the field of criminal law, this
recommendation probably will draw fire from both the prosecution and
defense camps. Some defense counsel undoubtedly will claim that the
proposal does not go far enough. They will criticize the proposal's quali-
fication that protective orders be liberally available to prosecutors. That
criticism is unsound. Beginning in the 1970's, our society has become
more cognizant of the need to protect citizens who step forward to per-
form public service as witnesses in criminal cases. 7 ' The empirical evi-
dence of the extent of the problem of witness intimidation in America is
too impressive to be ignored.176 Establishing onerous requirements for
protective orders would slight the public interest in shielding witnesses
from harassment.
For their part, some prosecutors will take issue with the basic thrust of
the recommendation. They will claim that the recommendation goes too
far in recognizing a general right to pretrial discovery of the prosecu-
tion's uncharged misconduct evidence. They will adopt the position that,
with the exception of the few types of evidence-such as confessions-
which the defense has a right to discover, discovery should be entrusted
to the judge's discretion. This position overlooks the unique character of
uncharged misconduct evidence. Since this evidence relates to transac-
tions other than the offense mentioned in the prosecution pleading, the
evidence poses a special risk of surprise at trial. Moreover, the evidence
can have a marked impact on the trial, as demonstrated by the Williams
and von Bulow cases. Uncharged misconduct evidence is so potent that
its presentation against an unprepared defense can change the outcome
of the case.
Worst of all, the changed outcome may be an unjust conviction. Jus-
tice Cardozo cautioned that, more so than any other type of prosecution
evidence, uncharged misconduct testimony represents a "peril to the in-
nocent."' 177 In our system, it is axiomatic that the defendant need answer
only for the crime for which he is currently charged. 7  The Supreme
Court has held that the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
information. Rule 16(a)(1)(A), for example, requires the prosecution to divulge the sub-
stance of even oral statements made by the defendant. Under Rule 16(a)(1)(B), the crimi-
nal record provision, prosecutors must reveal both convictions and rap sheet entries. See
supra note 44.
175. See M. Graham, supra note 150, at 9-10; see also supra notes 150-56 and accom-
panying text.
176. See M. Graham, supra note 150, at 4-8.
177. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 198, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930).
178. See Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in
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punishment forbids a legislature from making a personal status such as
drug addiction a criminal offense.17 9 Whenever the trial judge admits
evidence of a criminal defendant's uncharged conduct, however, a grave
risk arises that, in effect, the jury will convict the defendant of a status
offense-the status of being a recidivist criminal. Uncharged misconduct
evidence can pollute the defendant's character in the jurors' eyes. I' The
evidence can exert a pernicious, subconscious influence on the jury.181
Once the jury learns of the defendant's criminal past, they may be sorely
tempted to convict even though a substantial doubt exists as to the de-
fendant's guilt of the charged offense.
An essential part of the ethos of the adversary system stems from the
belief that both sides should have an equal chance to prepare to meet the
evidence proffered at trial. 82 In most jurisdictions, the criminal defend-
ant possesses no guaranteed opportunity to prepare to meet uncharged
misconduct evidence--evidence that is likely to surprise the defense and
that may very well prompt an unjust conviction. Denying the defendant
that opportunity is nothing short of a scandal.
Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 731-32 (1981); Note, Evidence: State v.
Ellis: The Other WrongfulActs Rule, 15 Creighton L. Rev. 281, 284 (1981).
179. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
180. See State v. Goldsmith, 122 Wis. 2d 754, 758, 364 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Ct. App.
1985); see also supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
181. See Recent Cases, Criminal Law--Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes, 24
Temp. L.Q. 245, 246 (1950).
182. See generally Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958); Lind, Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of
Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1973); Thi-
baut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 386 (1972).
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